A Governmental Frame-Work for a Responsible Industry

The Dutch Experience

 

Address given at Mare Forum 99
Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Mr G. Nieuwpoort
Head, Division for Maritime Transport, Dutch Ministry of Transport
Tuesday, June 22nd, 1999

This session deals with the balance between governments and market forces, between governmental regulation and self-regulation. There can only be a balance when there is co-operation. Hopefully this joint presentation shows the possibilities of good co-operation between government and industry.

A governmental frame work for the industry is about relations between government and the market. The economic theory explains that "markets can be efficient institutions under specific conditions". There are many arguments for questioning the efficiency of the sea transport market, e.g. in relation to profits, safety and environment. Therefore, there are just as many arguments to question the specific conditions for this market. Market organisations always show rational economic behaviour. If the overall result e.g. in terms of safety and environment is not very optimal, then governments must not blame industry. First of all they have to reconsider the adequacy of the present conditions governments themselves are setting for the market.

The most basic conditions for an economic healthy and efficient sea transport market are internationally harmonised regulation and stringent enforcement. My next statement will not be a surprise: So far governments have failed.

There are three main reasons.

The first one is the imbalance in the relationship between government and the sea transport market. The market is international, but governments show a diversity of national interests. This can be seen even in the names: flag states, port states and coastal states. Only port states and coastal states are confronted with external costs of sea transport, not flag states. For this reason some flag states are optimising on registration income only, without any worries about external costs, e.g. inspection costs, clean up operations, etc.. No wonder that port states have taken over the role of flag states for quality control. But while port states have taken over responsibilities from flag states, the necessary authority and jurisdiction still remains with flag states.

The second reason is the regulatory system itself. Legislation can only be effective if it is supported and implemented by the industry itself. However, the present legislation is very specific and detailed, very prescriptive and input-directed. It only targets the ship owner. Everyone else is very easily let off the hook. It is cost-increasing, while the focus in the industry is on cost-reduction. It is hampering flexibility in day to day operations, which is crucial for the industry, and it kills innovation. In other words, it tells the industry what to do and how to do it, in a very direct way.

The overall effect is that the regulator takes over the responsibility from the industry. Quite the opposite from the intention of the legislation, I suppose. It puts all the pressure on the possibilities of governments to enforce.

In this process the industry is guilty by association. Industry asks for more detailed regulation in order to prevent distortion of competition. Management attention is only directed at cost reduction and it shows calculating behaviour towards the regulations the industry has sometimes even asked for. This will continue so as long as safety and environment are not an integral part of management decisions. This is exactly the focal point, decisions by management. The present regulatory system is fighting the symptoms of a badly maintained ship, an incompetent crew, while the origin is the management of the company. And the management simply utilises present conditions. E.g. PSC is being used as a periodic maintenance check-up, while in the past ship owners did their own maintenance check-ups.

Instead of blaming the industry for this behaviour, the regulator must create a frame work, which does not take over responsibilities but gives incentives for a responsible industry.

The third reason is the lack of effective enforcement. Crucial here is the relation between flag state control and port state control. Port state control can by nature only be end-of-the-line control targeted at the ship, while flag states can control at the beginning by targeting the shipping company. However, at this moment port state control does the mopping up while the flag state tap keeps running. Effective enforcement is only possible with control at both the beginning and end of the system, when both flag state and port state control are doing what they ought to do. In this respect the pressure is on flag states. One possible way forward is the development of a Network of Quality Registers, as was discussed in Session 2.

All these reasons point in one direction: the checks and balances in the sea transport market are not working. What to do about it?

The basic elements for a governmental frame work directed at improving the necessary checks and balances can already be found in the conference programme:

*   a regulatory system created by flag states and IMO, based on output regulation. It gives incentives for a responsible industry based on self-regulation. However, realistic responsibility of the industry can only coincide with accountability. The flag state must safeguard the system of self-regulation. The Network of Quality Registers can play an important role in the dialogue between flag states and industry.

*   self-regulation by the industry, e.g. via codes of conduct , codes of best practice, total quality management. Self-regulation of the industry is not directed at ship owners only. It is about accountabilities of all market players, like classification societies, insurers, cargo owners, bankers.

*   quality management systems for shipping companies, inspected and certified by classification societies. Flag states will have to inspect and certify the classification societies. In this way control at the beginning of the system is provided.

*   stringent last resort enforcement by PSC, via targeting and penalising of sub-standard vessels and operators.

*   transparent information on quality of ship and its management is essential. Only with valid information on quality available insurers, classification societies, etc. can quality shipping be given the necessary incentives. To realise this, information coming from PSC and classification societies must be improved. EQUASIS can play an important role here.

This frame work is all about checks and balances, necessary for obtaining a better equilibrium between the striving for profits and continuity by the industry on the one hand and the necessity to reduce social costs of sea transport on the other. Checks and balances between e.g. industry and government, ship owners and cargo owners, flag states and port states, flag states and classification societies are essential for a sustainable market for sea transport.

The shipping company needs flexibility and control in all operational aspects. Therefore the company must be responsible for all aspects, including safety and environment. However, this is not about unlimited freedom for the industry. The goal is to secure self-regulation of the industry, within the limits for e.g. safety and environment. The frame work is directed at the output of the industry, it must be applied very strictly and must give enough time for the industry to anticipate and seek innovative solutions. It must create optimal conditions for companies to seek their own solution via innovation in products or processes.

How realistic is such a frame work? What does the industry feel about self-regulation? Questions not to be answered by me, but by the industry. Mr. Korteland, the floor is yours.